The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter by Arendshorst, John
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 5
Fall 2009
The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar,
Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter
John Arendshorst
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 102
(2009).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol8/iss1/5
Copyright 2009 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 8, Issue 1 (Fall 2009) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
 
The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, 
Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter 
John Arendshorst* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On July 21, 2008, Myanmar1 ratified the Charter of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), raising controversy among member nations because of its 
abysmal human rights record and its continued detention of opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi.2  The Charter, which is the first such document in the forty-one year history of 
ASEAN,3 enumerates ASEAN purposes and principles and establishes formal rights and 
expectations of ASEAN members.4  Certain provisions in the Charter, including the 
establishment of an ASEAN human rights body, are in direct conflict with the ongoing 
human rights violations committed by Myanmar’s ruling military junta.  After a highly 
controversial process, ASEAN member countries agreed upon the terms for the human 
rights body stipulated in the charter, to be known as the Asian Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), in July 2009. The AICHR will formally take 
effect during the ASEAN summit in October 2009.5  However, no one is sure what effect, 
if any, the AICHR will have upon the situation in Myanmar. 
¶2 This comment will explore how the actions of the junta affect ASEAN, outline the 
potential measures by which ASEAN and the nascent AICHR could address Myanmar’s 
actions, and recommend a course of action.  First, this comment will lay out the reasons 
for the controversy, including Myanmar’s human rights record, and show how that record 
is viewed through various lenses of international law.  Next, this comment will give 
background on ASEAN and the Charter and explore the Charter’s implications for 
interaction between ASEAN and Myanmar.  Third, this comment will outline the various 
                                                 
* John Arendshorst is a J.D. Candidate at Northwestern University School of Law, 2010. He holds a B.A. in 
Mathematics and Economics from Williams College, 2004. 
1 The military Junta officially changed the English version of the country’s name from “Burma” to 
“Myanmar” in 1989.  However, this renaming has proven to be politically controversial, since the decision 
to rename has not received legislative approval in Burma/Myanmar.  The United States, Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, among other countries, continue to use the name “Burma,” since they do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the military government or its authority to rename the country.  However, the 
United Nations and ASEAN both refer to the country as “Myanmar.”  Since this comment is primarily 
concerned with the political dynamic between Burma/Myanmar and ASEAN, it will refer to the country as 
“Myanmar.” 
2 Dr. Surin Pitsuwan’s Remarks at the Ceremony for the Deposit of Myanmar’s Instrument of Ratification 
of the ASEAN Charter (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.aseansec.org/21762.htm. 
3 THE INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, FRAMING THE ASEAN CHARTER: AN ISEAS PERSPECTIVE 
(Rodolfo C. Severino, ed., 2005), available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/Framing_ASEAN_Charter.pdf.  
4 The ASEAN Charter art. 5 (2008), available at http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., ASEAN to Launch Human Rights Body, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, July 20, 2009, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/07/20097204241679480.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
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ways ASEAN could respond to Myanmar’s ongoing human rights violations.  Finally, 
this comment will recommend a course of action based on the ongoing welfare of 
ASEAN, the interests of the people of Myanmar, and the effect of various options on 
other national and international organizations. 
II. BACKGROUND ON MYANMAR 
¶3 Myanmar has suffered under the rule of its military for most of its independent 
political existence.  Myanmar, then named Burma, became an independent republic on 
January 4, 1948, after the withdrawal of the British colonial government.6  For fourteen 
years, representative democracy flourished in Burma, a time when the United Nations 
elected Burmese representative U Thant to become the first non-Westerner to head an 
international organization.7  However, this democracy was short-lived.  In 1962, General 
Ne Win led a military coup, overthrowing the democratically elected government to force 
the country along the “Burmese Way to Socialism.”8 Win went on to rule for twenty-six 
years.9 
¶4 The 1987 collapse of Burma’s economy and the subsequent political and economic 
unrest led to massive protests against Win’s government, culminating in the so-called 
“8888 Uprising” on August 8, 1988.10  During the uprising, military forces lashed out 
violently against demonstrators who called for economic reform and regime change, 
killing over 1000 people.11  Aung San Suu Kyi made her first political speech at a rally 
after the uprising and quickly emerged as a leader of the National League for Democracy 
(“NLD”), a group that opposed the military rule of Burma.12  She won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1990 for her efforts, but the military junta has kept her under house arrest for 
much of their subsequent rule.13  On August 11, 2009, the government extended her 
detention for eighteen months, a sentence that will prevent her from participating in 
Myanmar’s 2010 elections.14  
¶5 In the turmoil that followed the uprising, a new group of military leaders staged a 
coup against Ne Win, seized power, abolished the constitution, and established a ruling 
military junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (“SLORC”).15  As part 
of its effort to restore order and secure its hold on the country, the SLORC cracked down 
brutally on dissidents, killing thousands, and ruled by martial law until holding 
                                                 
6 BURMA IN TURMOIL 11 (Alden T. Roycee ed., 2008). 
7 Id. As an interesting note, a young Aung San Suu Kyi was among the Burmese to work at the UN while U 
Thant was Secretary General. 
8 Id. at 12. 
9 Id. 
10 DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY, THREAT TO THE PEACE: A CALL FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO 
ACT IN BURMA 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter THREAT TO THE PEACE]. 
11 Id. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: BURMA (2008), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Background Note]. 
12 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 10. 
13 BURMA IN TURMOIL, supra note 6, at 15. 
14 See, e.g., Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Ordered Back Into House Detention, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE57A04C20090811?sp=true (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
15 Background Note, supra note 11. 
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parliamentary elections on May 27, 1990.16  During this time, the SLORC officially 
changed the English version of the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar.17 
¶6 The NLD won 392 of the 485 seats in the elections, despite the fact that the 
SLORC had placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest.18  However, the SLORC 
refused to honor the results of the election, maintaining its grip on power and imprisoning 
many dissidents.  In 1997, the SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and 
Development Council (“SPDC”), but did not change any of its autocratic and oppressive 
policies.19  On June 23, 1997, Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN.20 
¶7 In August 2007, high prices sparked a new wave of opposition by pro-democracy 
groups that protested the deteriorating economic situation.21  The government imprisoned 
many of the protestors, and Buddhist monks began leading protest marches in response.  
Ordinary citizens joined the monks, culminating in a march of over 10,000 people in the 
capital city of Rangoon (Yangon) on September 24, 2007.  On September 26, the 
government began to crack down violently on the marchers, using of “tear gas and smoke 
grenades, severe beatings with wooden and bamboo sticks, rubber batons and slingshots 
(catapults) … rubber bullets and live rounds.”22 More than thirty people were killed.23 
¶8 To address widespread international condemnation of the SPDC’s response to the 
protests, the government held a constitutional referendum on May 10, 2008 (delayed until 
May 24 in some areas due to Cyclone Nargis).24  However, the new constitution proffered 
by the SPDC contained some questionable provisions, including one that reserved one-
fourth of parliament seats for members of the military, and another that barred anyone 
married to a foreigner from becoming president (Aung San Suu Kyi had been married to 
a British citizen).25  Reports of widespread corruption and voter intimidation surfaced 
during the referendum, including pre-marked ballot papers, threats of physical violence, 
and forced voting.26  Despite reports of low voter turnout, the government eventually 
announced that 98.12 percent of eligible voters had voted, with the SPDC’s new 
constitution receiving an overwhelming 92.48 percent of the vote.27 





20 See, e.g., ASEAN Secretariat, Political Achievement, http://www.aseansec.org/11833.htm (last visited 
Sep. 28, 2009). 
21 Background Note, supra note 11. 
22 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/14 (Dec. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/6session/A.HRC.6.14.doc. 
23 Id. 
24 Myanmar Says Referendum Will Go Ahead in Most Of Country – Update, THOMPSON FINANCIAL NEWS, 
May 6, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/05/06/afx4973005.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009). 
25 See New Burma Constitution Published, BBC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7338815.stm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009); Marwaan Macan-Markar, New Constitution Gives 
Impunity to Military, IPS, Apr. 17, 2008; Michael V. Aris, 53, Dies; Scholarly Husband of Laureate, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 30, 1999, at C27, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E4DE1E30F933A05750C0A96F958260. 
26 See Yeni and Min Lwin, Massive Cheating Reported from Referendum Polling Stations, THE 
IRRAWADDY, May 10, 2008, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=11923 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2009). 
27 Myanmar Formally Announces Ratification of New Constitution Draft, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, May 
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¶9 It is evident that the military has maintained its tight grip on all aspects of 
Myanmar society and politics.  Although the worst of the violence has ceased, as of June 
2008, “the situation of human rights in Myanmar . . . has not changed for the better.”28 
III.  HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR AND EFFECTS ON ASEAN 
¶10 The SLORC and SPDC have compiled a horrific and extensive record of human 
rights violations during their reign over Myanmar.  Violations committed by the armed 
forces, primarily against ethnic minorities, have included extrajudicial and arbitrary 
killings, rape, torture, arbitrary arrests for political reasons, forced labor, forced 
conscription into the military, denial of freedom of movement, and tight restrictions on 
press, religion, speech, and assembly.29  The U.S. Department of State assessed that the 
situation worsened during 2007 due to the government’s harsh crackdown on pro-
democracy protests.30  This deteriorating human rights record is due not to isolated acts of 
individuals; rather, it stems from policies set at the highest levels of government.31  
Moreover, the government’s numerous violations have adversely affected people not only 
in Myanmar, but also in neighboring countries. 
¶11 The SPDC has claimed that they are fighting ethnic minority insurgents in areas of 
Myanmar and that its techniques are part of a “four cuts” strategy to quell the insurgency: 
cutting off food, funds, intelligence, and recruits to the insurgents.32  As part of the four 
cuts strategy, the military has perpetrated widespread violations of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, including the deprivation of means of livelihood, the destruction of 
houses, excessive taxation, and extortion.  The military has often used force against 
civilians far in excess of the level necessary for counter-insurgency operations.33  
Furthermore, armed forces are present even in ceasefire areas and areas not involved in 
counterinsurgency activity.34   
¶12 A significant part of the four cuts strategy is the destruction of villages.  The 
International Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that between 1996 and 2007, 
over 3100 villages in eastern Myanmar were destroyed, relocated, or abandoned.35  As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
30, 2008, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6421254.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
28 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/H/12 (June 3, 2008), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/8/12&Lang=E [hereinafter Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, 2008]. 
29 See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA, available 
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100515.htm [hereinafter Department of State 2007 Report]; see 
also U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/53/654 (Sept. 10, 1998), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/270/28/PDF/N9827028.pdf [hereinafter Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, 1998]. 
30 Department of State 2007 Report, supra note 29. 
31 Report of the Special Rapporteur,1998, supra note 29, at ¶ 59. 
32 Genocide Intervention Network: Eastern Burma, 
http://www.genocideintervention.net/educate/crisis/burma (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  See also THREAT TO 
THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 35. 
33 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 35. 
34 Paulo Pinherio, Statement on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar to the 61st Session of the 
Commission of Human Rights, Item 9 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
35 INTERNATIONAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, MYANMAR (BURMA): NO END IN SIGHT FOR 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CRISIS 5 (2008), http://www.internal-
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result, over half a million people have become internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) – 
people who have been unable to return, resettle, or reintegrate after being forced to leave 
their homes.36  Forced relocations “are often accompanied by killings, forced labor, 
systematic rape, and wholesale destruction of villages, crops, and land.”37  In addition, these 
forced relocations have resulted in a large number of externally displaced people.  The 2009 
World Refugee Survey states that Myanmar has produced over 750,000 refugees, including 
361,100 in Thailand, 193,000 in Bangladesh, 100,000 in India, and 79,000 in Malaysia.38  
Millions more have fled Myanmar but are not officially documented as refugees.39  In 
addition to being the victim of legal and human rights abuses in Myanmar,40 these refugees 
and migrants have placed a considerable strain on the governments of neighboring countries.  
For instance, Thailand initially accepted thousands of refugees from Myanmar.  Since the 
refugee camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border have existed for over three decades with 
increasing populations and few signs of progress, the Thai government has begun to lose 
patience.41  Thailand is resisting additional refugee flows, even going so far as to forcibly 
repatriate some refugees.42  Despite these problems, ASEAN has refused to address this 
decades-long exodus.43 
¶13 The human rights crisis in Myanmar also has harmed neighboring countries 
through the production and distribution of illegal drugs.  Myanmar is estimated to be the 
world’s second largest producer of opium and heroin and has recently begun to produce 
significant amounts of amphetamine-type stimulants.44  The flow of narcotics out of 
Myanmar has made drug control all but impossible in neighboring countries such as 
China and Thailand.  Thailand is currently experiencing an epidemic of amphetamine 
abuse,45 and a “heroin trail” leads from Myanmar into China’s southern provinces.46 
Myanmar’s production and trafficking of drugs has likely contributed to a tragic 
secondary effect among its neighbors.  The HIV/AIDS epidemic has rapidly spread in 
countries along Myanmar’s drug routes.47  For instance, 80% of the HIV/AIDS cases in 
China can be traced back to Myanmar through drug trafficking.48   




37 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 36. 
38 U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2009: REFUGEES AND 
ASYLUM SEEKERS WORLDWIDE 32-33 (2009), 
http://www.refugees.org/FTP/WRS09PDFS/RefuandAsylumseek.pdf. 




40 Violations include problems with crime, corruption, poverty, and violence, among other things.   
41 Burma Lawyer’s Council, Analysis of the Situation of the Refugee Camps from the Rule of Law Aspect, 
26 LAWKA PALA (LEGAL JOURNAL ON BURMA) 38, 56-57 (2007). 
42 Id. See also GUY HORTON, DYING ALIVE 509-10 (2005), http://burmalibrary.org/docs3/Horton-2005.pdf. 
43 See, e.g., David Scott Mathieson, In Ignoring the Rohingyas, ASEAN Rejects a New Role, THE JAKARTA 
GLOBE, May 25, 2009, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/in-ignoring-the-rohingyas-asean-rejects-a-
new-role/277126 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
44 U.S. Takes Aim at Drugs in Burma, Afghanistan, RADIO FREE ASIA, Mar. 4, 2005, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/burma/us_drugs_asia-20050304.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
45 ALTERNATIVE ASEAN NETWORK ON BURMA, A FAILING GRADE: BURMA’S DRUG ERADICATION EFFORTS 
19 (2004), http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Special%20Reports/Failing%20Grade.pdf. 
46 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 55. 
47U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime, Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia: Reducing HIV Vulnerability 
Vol. 8:1] John Arendshorst 
 
 107
¶14 The SPDC claims to have undertaken substantial steps to reduce opium production. 
However,  many international observers believe the regime is insincere in its commitment 
to curb the drug trade.49  Others believe that the government has formed partnerships with 
drug producers and traffickers and raises funds through their operations.50 
¶15 The human rights record of the SPDC and its predecessors in Myanmar is nothing 
short of deplorable.  Citizens of Myanmar suffer horrific human rights violations, as 
summarized by the UN Commission on Human Rights: 
Extrajudicial killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence persistently 
carried out by members of the armed forces, continuing use of torture, 
renewed instances of political arrests and continuing imprisonment and 
other detentions . . . destruction of livelihoods and confiscations of land by 
the armed forces; forced labor, including child labor; trafficking in 
persons; denial of freedom of assembly, association, expression and 
movement; discrimination and persecution on the basis of religious  or 
ethnic background . . . systematic use of child soldiers; and violations of 
the rights to education and to an adequate standard of living, including 
food and medical care.51 
This problem has spilled over into neighboring countries through the migration of 
refugees, the trafficking of illicit drugs, and the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Not 
only do the government’s actions oppress its own people, but also they create 
destabilizing effects that threaten the peace, security, and prosperity of all of Southeast 
Asia.52 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND MYANMAR 
¶16 Many significant human rights bodies, treaties, and charters apply directly to the 
current situation in Myanmar.  This section will demonstrate that the SPDC violates the 
tenets of numerous bodies of numerous international treaties and charters to which 
Myanmar is a party, including United Nations rules, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Moreover, the SPDC contravenes numerous other 
instruments of customary international humanitarian law, including the Rome Statute 
defining Crimes against Humanity. 
¶17 Myanmar is a member of the United Nations, having joined on April 19, 1948, 
shortly after its independence from Britain.53  During the rule of the SPDC, the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
from Drug Abuse, 33, U.N. Doc. AD/RAS/02/G22 (2004). 
48 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 58. 
49 Id. at 51. 
50 Id. at 54. 
51 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Agenda Item 9: Question of the Violation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World – Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, 61st Sess., April 29, 2005. 
52 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 34. 
53 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Member States of the United Nations, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/HumanRightsintheWorld.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
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Nations has devoted significant effort to promoting human rights and political change in 
Myanmar, without significant effect.  Recent UN efforts have focused on national 
reconciliation and the promotion of democracy. However, the SPDC has shown no 
inclination to accept true democracy, having refused even to engage in dialogue with the 
NLD.54  The UN Commission on Human Rights established a mandate on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar in 1992 and has appointed a series of diplomats as Special 
Rapporteur to Myanmar to investigate the human rights conditions and facilitate 
dialogue.55  However, the SPDC has reacted to the Special Rapporteur with disinterest, 
lack of engagement, or even outright stonewalling.  The SPDC even prevented the 
Special Rapporteur from visiting Myanmar between 2004 and 2007,56 demonstrating 
extreme disregard for the United Nations and a refusal to cooperate with its 
recommendations and sanctions.57  Although Myanmar acceded to requests for visits 
from the Special Rapporteur in August 2008 and February 2009,58 the Special Rapporteur 
reported that the situation in Myanmar remains “challenging” and the implementation 
and completion of UN human rights recommendations “has yet to be seen.”59  Despite 
condemning the actions of the SPDC on numerous occasions, the UN has had limited 
effectiveness in promoting change in Myanmar. 
¶18 In addition to joining the United Nations, Myanmar signed the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 on August 25, 1992.60  Article Three, common to all four Geneva 
Conventions, protects “persons taking no active part in hostilities in internal conflicts.”61  
An extensive report prepared by independent investigator Guy Horton, co-funded by the 
Netherlands Ministry for Development Co-Operation, found that the SPDC had likely 
violated the Conventions’ prohibitions on “[v]iolence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal 
dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”62   
¶19 While the Geneva Convention continues to dictate international laws of war, the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has added teeth to those laws by providing for the 
punishment of individuals who violate them.  Enacted in 2002 through the Rome Statute, 
the ICC has attracted the membership of 110 states.63  Although by Myanmar has not 
                                                 
54 THREAT TO THE PEACE, supra note 10, at 65. 
55 See generally U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights Myanmar, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/countries/mm/mandate/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2009; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, 2008, supra note 28. 
56 BURMA IN TURMOIL, supra note 6, at 59. 
57 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, 2008, supra note 28, at ¶ 71. 
58 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶ 15, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/19 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/A.HRC.10.19.pdf [hereinafter Report of 
the Special Rapporteur, 2009]. 
59 Id. at ¶¶ 86-87. 
60 Myanmar is hardly unique in this regard. In 2006, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 became the first 
treaties in modern history to be ratified by every state in the world.  See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, 
& RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 395-401 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 
Steiner]. 
61 Geneva Conventions of 1949, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView. 
62 HORTON, supra note 42, at 170-71.  For more information about the Horton report, see John Macgregor, 
A Witness’ Plea to End Myanmar Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/world/asia/18iht-burma.html. 
63 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.html (last visited Sep. 16, 
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signed or acceded to it, it is “the international community's most authoritative statement 
of international law” and may be considered a part of customary international law.64    For 
instance, during a trial of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the prosecutor stated, “[d]epending on the matter at issue, the Rome Statute may be taken 
to restate, reflect, or clarify customary rules or crystallize them, whereas in some areas it 
creates new law or modifies existing law . . . the Rome Statute by and large may be taken 
as constituting an authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of 
States.”65 
¶20 The Rome Statute states that the Court “shall have jurisdiction in respect of war 
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”66  Many of the crimes under the purview of the ICC have 
been committed in Myanmar. However, as Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute, 
the ICC may not have jurisdiction over its citizens.  Usually, the ICC has jurisdiction 
only over nationals of a state party or over crimes committed within the territory of a 
state party.67  However, the ICC also may exercise jurisdiction over situations referred to 
the court by the United Nations Security Council,68 a criteria which may eventually apply 
to the case of Myanmar.  Nevertheless, even if the jurisdiction of the ICC does not apply 
directly to the crisis in Myanmar, the Rome Statute may be seen as an expression of 
customary international law due to the sheer number of countries that have ratified it, and 
it may provide a useful framework for understanding the severity of the SPDC’s human 
rights violations against the people of Myanmar. 
¶21 Moreover, the independent Horton report alleges that due to the systematic 
targeting of certain ethnic minorities by the military, the SPDC may also be guilty of 
genocide.69  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which Myanmar ratified on March 14, 1956,70 defines genocide as certain 
attacks against a group of people “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”71    The attacks of the SPDC military have 
been focused almost exclusively on ethnic minorities, and the pattern of murder, rape, 
and displacement provides evidence of a larger goal that may fit the Convention’s 
definition of genocide.72 
¶22 Myanmar has committed violations of numerous other treaties it has ratified or 
accessed.  The government accessed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on July 
15, 1991, yet twenty percent of its army is composed of child soldiers as young as eleven 
years old.73  Myanmar is a party to the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labor of 1930, yet the government compels more than 800,000 of its citizens to work for 
                                                                                                                                                 
2009). 
64 HORTON, supra note 42, at 148. 
65 Prosecutor v.Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 227 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
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little or no pay.74  Myanmar is a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, yet the military perpetrates systemic sexual violence 
against rural women from minority ethnic groups, and in some regions the government 
are denies birth certificates to women and prohibits them from serving in certain 
professions.75 The government has also committed numerous and flagrant violations of 
the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize of 1948, most recently visible during the protests of September 2007. 
¶23 The atrocities committed by the SPDC violate the provisions of numerous sources 
of international law, creating the perception of Myanmar as a rogue nation. 
V. THE ASEAN CHARTER, THE AICHR, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
¶24 This section will explore the effect of the human rights provisions in the recently 
implemented ASEAN Charter, including the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), on international treatment of Myanmar.  First, 
this section will outline history and purpose of ASEAN.  Next, this section will discuss 
the new ASEAN Charter, including its intent, benefits, and human rights provisions, and 
the resulting creation of the AICHR.   Finally, this section will examine the proposed 
human rights mechanism within ASEAN. 
¶25 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand founded ASEAN in 
1967 to “accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region and … to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law.”76  ASEAN initially met with success primarily in the political field, 
as it facilitated relations among member governments in the turmoil following the 
Vietnam War.77  However, ASEAN has become an economic force in the wake of the 
1992 ASEAN Summit, which introduced the idea of an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.78  
This idea has progressed to the point where many observers envision a European Union-
style single ASEAN market by 2015.79 
¶26 Since its foundation as a loose confederation of five nations, membership in 
ASEAN has grown to ten countries, including Myanmar, which joined on July 23, 
1997.80  The inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN was controversial and met with much 
international criticism.  However, fears among ASEAN members regarding Myanmar’s 
economy and human rights practices ultimately were outweighed by greater fears that 
Myanmar’s continued exclusion from ASEAN would be an open invitation for China and 
other powers to seize a greater role in the region.81  Internationally, ASEAN members 
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defended the decision on the grounds that member states would be a positive influence on 
Myanmar.82 
¶27 For much of its history, ASEAN has operated without a formal charter.83  Members 
have traditionally preferred a structure with few binding agreements and decisions made 
only by consensus.  However, in 2005, ASEAN members began discussing the 
construction of a formal charter for ASEAN.  When these talks started, the Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) published a study that explained why such a charter 
would be beneficial to ASEAN: 
ASEAN has no central institutions to uphold compliance with them. It has 
nobody to call a member-state to account for non-compliance with the 
agreements. ASEAN has no credible mechanisms for settling disputes in 
an objective and binding manner. . . . Without a comprehensive set of 
values and principles explicitly adopted, ASEAN cannot on the basis of 
objective and agreed-upon criteria call its members to account for acts that 
have adverse impacts on fellow-members or on the region as a whole. 
Without it, ASEAN cannot credibly set the direction in which it is 
headed.84 
Motivated by concerns such as these, ASEAN member states overcame their reluctance 
to take any action that might compromise their state sovereignty and agreed to draft a 
charter. 
¶28 The drafters of the ASEAN Charter stated that for the Charter to be legally binding, 
all ten member states had to ratify it before the 14th ASEAN Summit in December 2008.  
After the Charter was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, six of the 
ten ASEAN nations ratified it within four months.85  Despite the human rights provisions 
included in the Charter, Myanmar ratified it on July 18, 2008.86  However, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, all democracies, delayed signing the Charter to protest the 
lack of action taken to force change in Myanmar and the continued detention of Aung 
San Suu Kyi.  Indonesia, in particular, threatened not to ratify the Charter until ASEAN 
had made concrete progress on the human rights body promised by the Charter.87  
Nevertheless, all three countries eventually ratified the Charter despite their objections.88  
The Charter took effect to great fanfare on December 15, 2008, yet concerns lingered 
about whether its focus on human rights was sufficiently comprehensive.89 
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¶29 ASEAN has historically espoused a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of its member states, which has manifested itself in a policy toward Myanmar of 
“constructive engagement.”90  The goal of the policy of constructive engagement is 
gradual change in the human rights situation of Myanmar through cooperation between 
ASEAN and Myanmar on a variety of issues.91  However, critics have alleged that the 
true aim of the policy is to deflect pressure for EU and U.S. sanctions so that economic 
activities between ASEAN and the SPDC can continue unimpeded.92  Regardless of the 
true ambition of the constructive engagement policy, the Charter contains some powerful 
language that dramatically affects this stance. 
¶30 The ASEAN Charter states that the purposes of ASEAN are “[t]o strengthen 
democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law … to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms,”93 and “[t]o enhance the well-being and 
livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to 
opportunities for human development, social welfare, and justice.”94  The Charter 
requires ASEAN member states to “adhere to the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government,”95 and to have “respect for fundamental freedoms, the 
promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice.”96  
Member nations are also required to uphold the United Nations Charter and other forms 
of international law, explicitly international humanitarian law.97  Criteria for admission to 
ASEAN include agreement to abide by the rules of the Charter and ability and 
willingness to carry out the conditions of membership.98 
¶31 Perhaps the most dramatic change effected by the Charter is the newfound concern 
for human rights: “[i]n conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN 
Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.”99 To structure this 
human rights body, ASEAN created the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism (“Working Group”) and charged it with examining several possible forms the 
human rights body could take.100 Potential options included a simple declaration of 
principles, a commission with “monitoring, promotional, and recommendary functions,” 
or a court with the power to issue binding decisions.101 
¶32 During the Working Group’s deliberations, some diplomats expressed the opinion 
that the new human rights body should not intervene in domestic human rights issues 
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such as the current crisis in Myanmar at all, but instead should protect countries from 
foreign meddling.102  As expected, Myanmar protested against the formation of a 
functional ASEAN human rights body, along with several other ASEAN member 
countries with authoritarian governments.103  On the other side, a number of countries 
both inside and outside of ASEAN argued for a legitimate human rights body that would 
feature enforcement capabilities in addition to mere advisory capacity.  The Working 
Group ultimately recommended that the human rights body be a commission, 
“constituting comprehensive human rights protection and reporting mechanisms.”104  
Such a body would have advisory and reporting functions, but no binding enforcement 
capabilities.105  The Working Group proposed that the primary task of the nascent human 
rights body should be to “promote and protect human rights,” which in its view includes 
raising awareness, advising, sharing information, and advocating, but not to pass 
judgment regarding human rights in any member nation.106 
¶33 The newly drafted Terms of Reference state that the purposes of the AICHR are 
“[t]o promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of 
ASEAN” and “[t]o uphold the right of the peoples of ASEAN to live in peace, dignity 
and prosperity.”107  AICHR will serve these aims by “promot[ing] human rights,” 
“enhanc[ing] regional cooperation,” and “uphold[ing] international human rights 
standards as prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, and international human rights instruments.”108  
However, noticeably absent from the AICHR Terms of Reference are any mention of 
enforcement power or ability to address country-specific human rights crises.  In fact, one 
of the AICHR’s guiding principles is a continuation of ASEAN’s long-standing respect 
for non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.109 
¶34 The Terms of Reference drafted by the Working Group essentially removed any 
possibility that the new human rights body would have any enforcement power.110  
Indeed, when ASEAN formally approved the terms of reference for the AICHR on July 
20, 2009, more than two years after the ASEAN Charter mandated the creation of a 
human rights body, the human rights community reacted with disappointment.111  While 
Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, host of the ASEAN summit at which the AICHR 
agreement was reached, noted that the commission would “first focus on the promotion 
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of human rights rather than its protection,”112 pundits accused the AICHR of being 
“toothless,”113 “outrageous,”114 and having “little value.”115  Even ASEAN Secretary-
General Surin Pitsuwan admitted that the AICHR would not substantially affect 
Myanmar, stating that “ASEAN will continue to have a burden on its lap to explain to the 
world.”116 
¶35 When it is formally established at the ASEAN Summit in October 2009, the 
AICHR will join a growing population of other regional (as opposed to global) human 
rights systems.  Regional human rights bodies enjoy several distinct advantages over 
global bodies such as the United Nations: they capitalize on geographic, historical, and 
cultural bonds among neighboring states, their recommendations often meet with less 
resistance than those issued by a global body, they can publicize information about 
human rights more easily and effectively, and they are less prone to general compromises 
stemming from political intractability.117  Such systems use a variety of methods to 
achieve their aim of promoting human rights within their given geographical area.  For 
instance, the European system is focused on its productive court, the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”), and the resulting body of decisions has helped ease the 
addition of new and diverse members to the European community.118  In contrast, 
although the Inter-American system includes a court, its key component is its 
Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), a body that does not have a parallel in the 
European system.119  The African system may be instructive as a basis for comparison in 
the future as well, but its court is currently in the process of developing as an 
institution.120  
¶36 The AICHR pales in comparison to other regional human rights bodies as an 
effective instrument to promote and enforce human rights.  The enforcement powers of 
the ECHR have a far greater effect on human rights than any provision of the AICHR 
could have, and the IACHR’s combination of a commission and a court has much the 
same effect.  Although the formation of the AICHR is a step in the right direction, as it 
formally recognizes the importance of promoting human rights among ASEAN member 
countries, it cannot have as significant an impact because it lacks any substantial means 
of penalizing human rights violators.  The SPDC has not responded to the broad 
international condemnation of its actions, and there seems to be no reason to believe that 
the AICHR will be anything more than just another voice clamoring ineffectively for the 
SPDC to stop. 
¶37 The ASEAN Secretariat has recognized that Myanmar is in the midst of “national 
reconciliation” and a “peaceful transition to democracy,” and it has called for Myanmar 
to release its political detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and take bolder steps 
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toward a peaceful transition to democracy.121  To this point, the SPDC has responded to 
this encouragement with reassurances of gradual change, but there exists little to no 
evidence that the SPDC actually intends to take the initiative in any progressive reforms.  
The new ASEAN Charter and the formation of the AICHR presented an opportunity for 
ASEAN to make a serious push for change in Myanmar. However, it appears that the 
AICHR as formed lacks the capability to do so by itself. 
VI. OPTIONS FOR ASEAN RESPONSE TO MYANMAR 
¶38 This section will review the merits of the various approaches ASEAN could take to 
address the conflict between the provisions of the Charter and the human rights record of 
Myanmar.  In this case, relevant language in the Charter includes not only Article 14, 
which calls for the formation of an ASEAN human rights body, but also the principles 
contained in Articles 1, 2, and 6 that mandate respect for international humanitarian law, 
fundamental freedoms, democracy, and social justice.  The formation of the AICHR is an 
important step in ASEAN’s effort to address human rights in Southeast Asia.  However, 
since the AICHR focuses on simply promoting human rights, rather than addressing 
specific situations, it probably will have little immediate effect with regard to reducing 
the current human rights abuses occurring in Myanmar.  To address the discrepancy 
between the letter and spirit of the Charter and the actions of the SPDC, ASEAN has 
several options, ranging from complete neglect to active sanctions or expulsion. 
A. Constructive Engagement 
¶39 The first option entails ASEAN reverting back to the historic policy of constructive 
engagement despite the human rights language in its new charter and the formation of the 
AICHR.  Although the AICHR will increase ASEAN’s focus on the promotion of human 
rights, it explicitly continues the policy of non-interference and takes a non-
confrontational approach toward human rights issues, as discussed above.122  Without 
further changes, AICHR will not modify ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement 
with Myanmar.  In practice, this means that ASEAN would likely do little or nothing to 
encourage democratic change and human rights progress in Myanmar, possibly going so 
far as to prevent interference from other international organizations.123 
¶40 This option would be the most comfortable for the member states of ASEAN, as 
they have demonstrated a historical reluctance to interfere with, or even offer opinions 
on, internal affairs of other member states.124  Moreover, although some Southeast Asian 
democracies such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand have spoken out against the 
human rights abuses in Myanmar, other ASEAN member states disagree over how to 
approach those issues.125 Due to this disagreement, ASEAN as a whole has taken a soft 
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position toward the SPDC in an attempt to promote regional unity and minimize inter-
country strife.126  From ASEAN’s perspective, maintaining constructive engagement 
between ASEAN and Myanmar is virtually frictionless, since it would merely continue 
the policy that has been in force since the SLORC rose to power. 
¶41 Furthermore, the constructive engagement approach would probably result in the 
greatest immediate economic gain to ASEAN member states.  They would continue to 
enjoy the benefits of effective exclusivity in trade with Myanmar, along with China, as 
most western countries have imposed severe restrictions on such trade.127  Although 
Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, wealthier nations have found trade with 
Myanmar profitable, as it is rich in natural resources such as timber, natural gas, and 
precious stones.128 
¶42 However, continuance of the constructive engagement approach would also create 
significant disadvantages.  ASEAN drafted its Charter and formed the AICHR with the 
intention of becoming a more rules-based organization, which could then “be courted by 
the major powers as an economic power and valued as a partner for cooperation to deal 
with larger regional and global issues.”129  If ASEAN allows Myanmar to flout multiple 
provisions in the Charter without repercussions, while failing to take even the smallest 
steps toward openness and democracy, the Charter loses its effect.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the Charter and the AICHR would squander their opportunity to build 
confidence among other treaty organizations, such as the European Union, NATO, and 
NAFTA, that ASEAN is a legitimate, respectable partner. 
¶43 By virtue of the drafting and ratification of the Charter, it would appear that 
ASEAN intends to develop into a more tightly-knit, rules-based organization that will 
command worldwide respect.  Therefore, the disadvantages of continuing the 
constructive engagement approach are significant.  For the Charter to be anything more 
than an empty promise to the rest of the world, ASEAN must take a more active approach 
to combating Myanmar’s human rights violations. 
B. Creation of an ASEAN Human Rights Court 
¶44 To address the weaknesses in the historical approach of constructive engagement, 
ASEAN could modify the terms of the AICHR to include a human rights court with the 
power to issue binding judgments.130  Such a court would provide a judicial, unbiased 
body to determine whether the SPDC violates the human rights and international 
humanitarian law provisions of the Charter.  It would clearly demonstrate the 
commitment of ASEAN to take a more serious approach to the blatant human rights 
violations within Myanmar. 
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¶45 The most prominent regional human rights court currently in existence is the 
ECHR.  The ECHR, which provides for both individual petitions131 and interstate 
complaints,132 is an integral component of the European Convention, a broad regional 
charter conceived to promote multinational peace in the wake of World War II. 133  The 
ECHR is designed not to supplant domestic human rights laws, but rather to serve as a 
remedy only after domestic remedies have been exhausted.134  The European Convention 
declares a clear preference for domestic resolution of complaints, mandating a full 
government consultation in the examination of complaints and encouraging “friendly 
settlement” whenever possible.135  If the European Convention and the ECHR were used 
as the template for creation of an ASEAN human rights court, such provisions would 
assuage the concerns of member states over threats to national sovereignty and regional 
amicability. 
¶46 Another possible structure for an ASEAN human rights court is exemplified by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  The IACHR is superficially similar to 
the ECHR in that it consists of a commission with investigatory and advisory powers and 
a court with contentious and advisory jurisdiction.136  However, the IACHR process of 
addressing potential human rights abuses focuses much more on the investigation of the 
commission than on the prosecution in the court.137  If the IACHR were used as the 
model for an ASEAN human rights court, the commission-first approach would help 
address members’ concerns about national sovereignty.   
¶47 Unfortunately, the eventual formation of a human rights court within the AICHR 
does not look likely.  Although the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism initially considered such a court as an option for the human rights body 
provided in Article 14 of the Charter,138 it was not included in the final Terms of 
Reference for the AICHR.139  After ASEAN members struggled as much as they did to 
forge an agreement on the Terms of Reference as they stand, it seems unlikely that the 
AICHR would drastically change its structure to include a court in the near future. 
C. ASEAN Sanctions Outside the Human Rights Mechanism 
¶48 ASEAN could address the human rights situation in Myanmar without creating a 
permanent court to issue enforceable judgments.  Even without considering the principles 
of the nascent AICHR, Myanmar has still violated a number of the core principles in the 
ASEAN Charter.  First, the Charter requires member states to practice democracy and 
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constitutional government.140  Although Myanmar is not the only ASEAN country under 
a non-democratic government, its system represses the will of the people to a greater 
degree than any other, and it is the only member ruled by a government that forcibly 
seized power from a constitutionally elected body.  Second, the Charter requires member 
states to promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, and social justice. The SPDC has 
perpetrated a pattern of extrajudicial killing and detention, systematic rape, and denial of 
numerous individual freedoms.141  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Charter 
requires member states to uphold the United Nations Charter and other forms of 
international law, explicitly including international humanitarian law.142  The SPDC 
flouts this requirement, consistently violating a plethora of such law as described above.  
The ASEAN Charter, which Myanmar ratified on July 18, 2008, includes a clause in 
which signatories must agree to abide by the rules of the Charter as a condition of 
membership.143  Under this clause, ASEAN would be fully justified in placing sanctions 
on Myanmar in an attempt to force change. 
¶49 If ASEAN took such an approach, other international organizations and nations 
would immediately accord it a much greater level of respect.  A demonstrated willingness 
to hold its members responsible for following its rules would establish ASEAN as a 
political, economic, and social force on the world stage akin to NATO or the European 
Union.  On the other hand, economic sanctions on Myanmar would create a real risk.  
Cutting off economic ties between Myanmar and its ASEAN trade partners would present 
an invitation for Chinese economic dominance of Myanmar, since China would be the 
only major economy still open to investment and trade with the SPDC.144  Such a 
development would have a negative impact on the prospect of human rights progress in 
Myanmar, as China has historically shown little interest in the non-economic affairs of its 
trading partners.145  However, it is uncertain whether ASEAN sanctions would 
significantly affect the level of Chinese influence in Myanmar, though, as Myanmar is 
increasingly dependent on China for economic support, regardless of ASEAN’s 
involvement.146  In the first ten years the SPDC held power, trade between Myanmar and 
China increased from $15 million to $800 million, a gain of over 5,300 percent.147  
Additionally, China already provides significant political, economic, and military 
assistance to the SPDC.  For instance, rebels fighting the junta in the northern Kachin 
province of Myanmar consider China the primary force supporting the junta, on account 
of its hydroelectric and resource extraction contracts.148  Since China already has free 
economic reign in Myanmar for all practical purposes, sanctions enacted by ASEAN may 
only cause a slight acceleration of Chinese influence.149   
                                                 
140 ASEAN Charter, supra note 4, at art. 2(h). 
141 See, e.g., Department of State 2007 Report, supra note 29; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, 
1998, supra note 29. 
142 ASEAN Charter, supra note 4, at art. 2(j). 
143 Id. at art. 6(2)(c)-(d). 
144 CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 81, at 43. 
145 See, e.g., id. at 35. 
146 Id. at 16. 
147 Id. at 41. 
148 Online Interview with Tim Patterson, journalist for the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting who spent a 
month embedded with the Kachin Independence Army in northern Myanmar in November-December 2008 
(Dec. 16, 2008) (on file with author). 
149 CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIZATION, supra note 81, at 19. 
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¶50 If ASEAN is too concerned about Chinese economic influence within Myanmar to 
implement effective economic sanctions, other sanctioning options may be available to 
send a message, both to the SPDC and to the world at large, that such human rights 
abuses will not be tolerated.  For instance, the European Union has the power to employ 
“restrictive measures” to promote human rights, including diplomatic sanctions, boycotts 
of sports or cultural events, flight bans, and restrictions on admission;150 ASEAN could 
use some of the same measures with respect to Myanmar.  However, non-economic 
sanctions may have little effect on the activities of the SPDC, since Myanmar is socially 
insular, and the SPDC has thus far shown little response to international shaming.  
Moreover, ASEAN may be even more reluctant to impose non-economic sanctions than 
economic ones, given its members’ traditional focus on non-interference and the 
appearance of propriety. 
¶51 In response to Myanmar’s extensive violations of the human rights and 
membership provisions of the Charter, ASEAN could take any one of several different 
tacks.  ASEAN could simply maintain its historic posture of constructive engagement 
with the SPDC.  Although that would be the simplest solution, it would significantly 
impede ASEAN’s development as a regional treaty organization with global cachet.  
Alternatively, ASEAN could modify the AICHR to include a human rights court that 
could issue enforceable judgments against member states that violate the human rights 
provisions in the Charter.  Although this approach would build global confidence in 
ASEAN, it does not appear to be practical at this time.  Finally, since Myanmar has 
violated many of the core principles of the Charter, ASEAN could legitimately impose 
sanctions outside the purview of the AICHR.  Although such an approach would risk 
accelerating China’s economic inroads in Myanmar, it would send a message that 
ASEAN is a modern treaty organization concerned about human rights.  The next section 
will discuss which of these approaches would be the best considering the interests of 
ASEAN, Myanmar, and the other member states. 
VII. WHAT SHOULD ASEAN DO? 
¶52 The first approach outlined in the previous section, the continuance of the policy of 
constructive engagement, is inadvisable for a number of reasons.  First, the 
implementation of the Charter presents a unique opportunity for ASEAN to move away 
from its historical policy of ignoring human rights abuses in member countries.  Before 
implementing the Charter and creating the AICHR, ASEAN was the last regional body 
not to have a human rights mechanism.151  If ASEAN simply ignores Myanmar’s blatant 
contravention of the human rights policies in the Charter, it would effectively negate its 
own human rights mechanism and lose an opportunity to become a peer of the other 
major regional organizations.  More importantly, ASEAN previously pledged its support 
for human rights in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, in which member states affirmed the 
principles contained in the 1948 United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on 
                                                 
150 European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy Overview – Sanctions, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf . 
151 See Pokpong Lawansiri, ASEAN Must Deliver on Human Rights Body, THE IRRAWADDY, June 16, 2008, 
available at http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=12761. 
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Human Rights.152  Reneging on the stand taken in the Bangkok Declaration would cripple 
ASEAN’s international credibility.  Although non-interference was one of ASEAN’s 
goals at the time of its founding in 1967, world standards for activism in human rights 
have changed over the past four decades, and a human rights mechanism is now 
considered an essential part of any legitimate regional organization.153  If ASEAN does 
not take some action against Myanmar’s human rights abuses, there is no chance that its 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights will maintain legitimacy.  Therefore, 
inaction under the guise of “constructive engagement” is no longer a viable option. 
¶53 The first path ASEAN could take to actually address the human rights violations in 
Myanmar would be the creation of a regional human rights court, with the ability to issue 
binding judgments on situations in member states.  Similar to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the African 
Commission for Human and People’s Rights, such a court would provide a neutral forum 
to interpret the human rights standards defined in the Charter, investigate alleged abuses, 
and litigate charges of violations.  An ASEAN human rights court, if agreed upon, would 
have the ability to firmly and definitively address the situation in Myanmar. 
¶54 However, it does not appear that ASEAN member states will agree upon the 
establishment of such a court in the near future.  The ten ASEAN nations are diverse in 
their histories, forms of government, and positions on human rights.  Only four of the ten 
states have national human rights institutes, and they have taken varying positions on the 
most prominent issues of international human rights law.154  Not all the states are party to 
such documents as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.155  Therefore, finding common ground on the creation of a 
court with the ability to enforce specific laws rather than merely uphold general 
principles would be extremely difficult.   
¶55 By contrast, political and economic sanctions could be developed and implemented 
quickly, and they would allow ASEAN to maintain flexibility in its dealings with 
Myanmar.  Sanctions would create some negative effects, primarily increased Chinese 
economic involvement in Myanmar, but they would be the most effective way of forcing 
the junta to change its ways.  Although repealing the unwritten policy of non-interference 
may be uncomfortable for the members of ASEAN, turning a blind eye to Myanmar by 
maintaining “constructive engagement” is no longer an option. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶56 The military junta that currently holds power in Myanmar has committed numerous 
horrific human rights violations.  In addition to harming the people of Myanmar, these 
abuses create significant negative effects for other members of ASEAN.  However, in 
                                                 
152 See MARUAH SINGAPORE, POSITION PAPER ON THE PROPOSED ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY n. 3 (Sept. 
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October 2008, ASEAN ratified a Charter that established formal human rights standards 
for its members and led to the formation of the AICHR as a tool for promoting those 
standards.   
¶57 Having ratified the Charter, ASEAN could take one of three approaches: it could 
continue its non-interventionist policy of “constructive engagement,” it could modify the 
AICHR to include a court that could issue binding judgments on human rights violations, 
or it could impose sanctions on or expel Myanmar for violating core principles of the 
ASEAN Charter.  The first option is inadvisable, since it would undermine ASEAN’s 
international credibility and negate the effectiveness of the human rights principles in the 
Charter and the legitimacy of the AICHR.  The second is impractical, since agreement on 
the mechanics of such a court would be difficult due to the diversity of ASEAN member 
states.  The third approach is the best, since it would prove to the world that ASEAN is a 
powerful, modern regional organization and still allow for flexibility in the future. 
